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Editorial
Politics, democracy and the 
machinery of the state
August 2016 will be remembered as a month in which South African politics underwent an historic 
shift. On 3 August 15 million of South Africa’s 26 million registered voters cast their ballots in the 
country’s local government elections. The result has been a shift in power, perhaps unlike any since 
the end of apartheid in 1994. 
When the votes had been counted and the two-week coalition negotiations had been concluded, 
the African National Congress (ANC) had lost majority control of the country’s political capital, 
Tshwane, its economic powerhouse, Johannesburg, and the metro named after its most iconic 
leader, Nelson Mandela Bay. Cape Town and the Western Cape remained firmly under Democratic 
Alliance (DA) control. This came after the DA, the Congress of the People (COPE)‚ the United 
Democratic Movement (UDM), the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) and the Freedom Front 
Plus (FF+) announced that they had formed a coalition across metros to keep the ANC out of power. 
But it was the newcomers, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), that sealed the fate of the ANC 
when they announced that they would vote with the DA-led opposition coalition, while opting out 
of any formal agreement with them. Considering the distance between the EFF’s socialist-
revolutionary and the DA’s neo-liberal ideologies, the EFF couldn’t have played its (limited) cards any 
more shrewdly. 
Despite these changes, it remains unclear whether the election results indicate a voting swing 
towards opposition parties, or a pulling away from – and so a vote against – the ANC. It is believed 
that 3 million ANC voters stayed away from the polls, severely eroding the ANC’s urban support. In 
Johannesburg, where the ANC’s provincial and municipal leadership has been popular, their ousting 
has been interpreted by some as a sign that residents are fed up with the ANC’s national leadership. 
Under President Jacob Zuma, ‘Brand ANC’ has been muddied and bloodied, taking the ANC in 
Gauteng down with it. 
Together, the message from opposition parties, and the electorate that ushered them in (whether 
through abstinence or votes), was that the ANC and Zuma’s ‘arrogance’ had gone too far. Theirs 
was a vote against Nkandla, the Guptas, the abuses at the SABC, Prasa, SAA and the broader 
corruption of the state. According to the Afrobarometer, trust in Zuma dropped from 62% in 2011 to 
just 34% in 2015. It is now probably even lower. 
By most accounts the election was a logistical success. Many would argue that it was also a victory 
for democracy – South Africans had a chance to see that their vote could shift power in a significant 
way. More than 63 000 candidates were up for election, representing 204 political parties. Figures 
released by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which coordinates elections, suggest that 
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96% of voters believed the elections were free and fair, and 92% trusted the IEC’s independence. 
And yet these figures hide something important. In the seven months preceding the election, at 
least 20 people were killed in what appear to be politically motivated assassinations. Many of these 
seem to have been the result of intra-ANC tensions. Factions within the ruling party appear to 
have clashed in their attempts to secure key positions and so access municipal budgets – and the 
patronage power linked to them. In this issue of SACQ, anthropologist and long-time monitor of 
violence in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), Mary de Haas, offers a unique insider’s analysis of the apparently 
politically motivated killings in KZN. 
At the time of going to press in late August, another major storm was brewing in South African 
politics. Social media quickly branded the scandal #SarsWars, a reference to Finance Minister Pravin 
Gordhan’s former position as head of the SA Revenue Service and a play on the famous movie 
franchise, Star Wars. The scandal has seen the police’s elite investigations unit, the Hawks, summon 
Gordhan to their offices, apparently to be warned of his imminent arrest. While the summons related 
to a secret SARS investigation unit established under Gordhan’s watch, legal commentators and 
Gordhan’s counsel apparently believed that he had not breached any law and had no case to 
answer. In response, ANC stalwarts, including George Bizos, Trevor Manuel and Sipho Pityana, 
called for the president to intervene, while Pityana went as far as calling on Zuma to step down. The 
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) confirmed, at the time of going to press, that it had received a 
docket on the matter from the Hawks, but said no decision had been taken to prosecute or not.
Against this background, the unorthodox Hawks engagement with Gordhan in late August 2016 
is believed by many to signal an abuse of the criminal justice system (the Hawks and NPA) to 
overcome the last barrier to a Zuma-linked coalition of politicians and business people, intent on 
plundering the state purse. One of the people accused of enabling this abuse is National Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Advocate Shaun Abrahams. We are thus very pleased to include in this issue 
an intimate and honest discussion between ISS Executive Director Anton du Plessis, ISS researcher 
Ottilia Maunganidze and Abrahams, conducted in July 2016. Here Abrahams answers some tough 
questions about his appointment and his vision for the NPA, and denies any political meddling on his 
or his colleagues’ part. 
While post-election shifts in power at the municipal level will be unlikely to shape these alleged 
national machinations in the criminal justice system, where opposition parties rule major metros 
they have gained immense financial power and responsibility. For instance, one of the first actions 
of incoming Tshwane mayor Solly Msimanga (DA) was to ban blue light police escorts for all but 
the president. Msimanga can enforce this with the Tshwane metro police, as the DA mayor of 
Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba, can do with the Johannesburg metro police. Part of the DA’s 
campaign in Nelson Mandela Bay included promises to show an impact on crime and disorder 
through its control of municipal law enforcement. 
Analysis by the ISS and Cornerstone Economic Research suggests that, having previously controlled 
over 82% of a R287 billion local government budget, the August 2016 elections reduced the ANC’s 
control to only 41.73%. In hung councils (where there was no outright winner) coalition budgetary 
control has surged from 2.63% in 2011 to 41.31% in 2016. Similar figures apply to overall capital 
expenditure budgets, which total R57 billion nationwide. These shifts are huge. Will the opposition 
and coalition governments be able to improve service delivery, including that of their municipal law 
enforcers – perhaps the most visible face of local government? Time will tell.
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Other articles in this issue explore some of the more technical aspects of criminal justice in South 
Africa. For instance, it is common to hear South Africans complain that the day following the 
arrest of a criminally accused person, the accused is ‘back on the street’. This, in part, reflects a 
misunderstanding about how bail works in South Africa, and the basic right of all accused to be 
granted bail. In this issue, Jameelah Omar explores whether the right to bail is granted to some and 
denied to others based on their economic status. With a focus on asset ownership and verifiable 
address, she suggests poor people are the unintended victims of discriminatory judgements.
In their contribution, Ursula Ehmke et al. question the reliability and accuracy of blood alcohol 
concentration results presented in South African courts, in cases where the driver is suspected of 
having been under the influence of alcohol. Having analysed samples from the Pretoria Forensic 
Chemistry Laboratory, they reveal an average delay of approximately five months between sample 
acquisition and laboratory analysis, with potentially detrimental effects on the course of justice. 
The authors call for urgent intervention in the ways in which samples are acquired, stored and 
analysed. With traffic enforcement a local competency in most of the country’s major cities, but 
with forensic laboratories nationally managed, this will be another area to watch with interest in 
opposition-run metros.
To mark the five-year review of the Child Justice Act, Marelize Schoeman asks whether the 
procedural mechanisms currently in place to determine the age of criminal capacity in South Africa, 
are adequate and in children’s best interests. Finally, Elrena van der Spuy reviews Don Pinock’s new 
book, Gang town. Noting that Pinock is perhaps ‘the most academically informed and practically 
qualified person in the Western Cape to write on youth gangs’, she discusses his contribution in 
relation to what is a rich literature on gangs, identity, youth and exclusion in South Africa. 
Lastly, as we prepare to bid farewell to SACQ’s Editor of nine years, Chandré Gould at the end 
of this year, I am very pleased to announce that we have welcomed three new members to the 
SACQ Board. They are: Dr Hema Hargovan, an academic and an Advocate of the High Court of 
South Africa, currently lecturing in the School of Built Environment and Development Studies at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal; Nwabisa Jama-Shai, a Senior Researcher at the South African Medical 
Research Council’s (MRC) Gender and Health Research Unit; and Nomfundo Mogapi, a clinical 
psychologist heading up the Trauma and Transition programme (TTP) at the Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR).  We are thrilled to have them on our team.
I hope you enjoy the issue. 
Andrew Faull
(Editor)
